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Abstract 
Economic growth rates in the Gulf region have languished in recent years and need to be raised 
to accommodate the rapidly growing populations and social aspirations of the region. Using a 
simple model of world trade, this report investigates the economic impacts of the new customs 
union of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) 
between the GCC and European Union. The quantitative results suggest that the new customs 
union and proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement both appreciably expand trade and improve 
economic welfare in the GCC countries, with little significant economic impact on the EU. As 
expected, the FTA results in larger GCC economic gains than the customs union because it 
affords GCC consumers greater opportunity to enjoy imports at internationally competitive 
prices. Although welfare gains under the proposed FTA closely approximate those under open 
regionalism (concerted trade liberalisation on a most favoured nation basis), reducing the 5% 
GCC common external tariff to about 3% as part of the FTA negotiations would not only ensure 
near-maximum trade performance and welfare gains but also add further to the attractiveness of 
the GCC countries as a location for foreign direct investment. 
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MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF AN EU-GCC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 206/JULY 2004 
DEAN A. DEROSA AND DAVID KERNOHAN 
1.  Introduction 
Generally speaking, the GCC countries have managed their hydrocarbon wealth reasonably 
well in recent decades amid volatile oil prices. The proceeds from oil have been used to 
modernise infrastructure, provide employment, improve social conditions and accumulate 
official reserves. External debt has remained relatively low in most GCC countries, inflation 
has been kept under control and exchange rate policy has been used effectively. In both 
economic and political terms, however, the GCC states have recently faced a number of 
economic challenges.  
In macroeconomic terms growth rates during the last decade were modest and the economies 
are now widely viewed as performing below their potential. There is general agreement that 
reduced vulnerability to oil price fluctuations and an accelerating non-oil growth are required 
to generate employment for a young and rapidly growing domestic labour force. Trade policy 
can play a role in assisting the region face these structural challenges, as well as facilitating 
the diplomatic agenda as the GCC states manoeuvre in the confines of a post-Iraq geopolitical 
landscape.  
In this respect, it is clear that the decision to advance the launch date for the GCC customs 
union (GCC-CU) to January 2003 (from 2005 as originally planned) has been of the utmost 
significance for the region. Tariff barriers to the free movement of national goods, labour and 
capital across the GCC countries have been eliminated, and individuals and corporations in 
the region have been granted national treatment for tax purposes in each country.  
The 5% common external tariff (CET) that has been adopted accords with the 
recommendations of various studies undertaken by the World Bank at the request of the 
secretary-general of the GCC, which is designed to keep the region’s growth potential in step 
with the fast pace of multilateral and regional tariff elimination – especially vis-à-vis EU 
preferential agreements.  
The EU is currently involved in trade liberalisation negotiations with several partners at the 
regional level. Among these regional negotiations are those for a free trade agreement (FTA) 
between the European Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(GCC), which date back to 1988 but have been re-invigorated since 1999 when the GCC 
issued its own negotiating mandate and announced a commitment to establish a customs 
union. 
Recently, the EU has advanced a new negotiating mandate, adapted to current WTO 
developments by including services and other areas included in more recent FTAs.  
Certainly, the GCC-CU will unlock some extra intra-GCC trade. To deliver the full benefits 
of a modern ‘oil plus’ economy, however, the GCC region would need to shift into higher 
value-added activities across a number of sectors. Unlocking potential wealth-generation from 2 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
new sectors and closing down inefficient ones should enable the region to use its rapidly 
growing labour force, indigenous skills and innovation capabilities more effectively – 
enabling a new generation of highly trained personnel to realise its full potential.  
Some core economic issues for the GCC states are as follows. First, how much they will they 
gain from the establishment of their customs union? Second, how much can they gain from 
any EU FTA over and above the generalised preference situation they currently enjoy? 
Finally, how much could the region as whole gain from Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO 
– an outcome that now looks almost certain to follow as a (partial) by-product of the ongoing 
EU-GCC trade negotiation process.  
2.  Economics of GCC states 
In 2001 the GCC region had a combined GDP of just over €368 billion with, as outlined in 
Table 1 below, GCC average GDP being €61.4 billion. Individual GDP figures for the six 
states range from €8.2 billion in the case of Bahrain, to €208 billion in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. Average GDP per capita is €16,645 – but this also conceals a range of numbers from a 
low of €8,562 for Oman to €31,158 for Qatar – with Saudi Arabia returning a surprisingly low 
GDP per capita figure of just over €9,000. 
Table 1. Key GCC economic data for 2001 
 GDP 
(€ billion) 
GDP
growth (%)
GDP/Capita
(€)
Imports 
(€ million)
Exports 
(€ million) 
EX/GDP
ratio
Bahrain  8.2  5.3 11,946 3,882 8,777  106%
Kuwait 37  -1 16,793  6,096  13,902  38%
Oman 22  3** 8,562  6,472  12,702  57%
Qatar 18  7.2 31,158  4,463  14,467  78%
Saudi  Arabia  208  1.2 9,766 42,171 76,493 37%
UAE  75  5.1 21,644 45,926 44,643 59%
Totals   368  -  16,645 109,010 170,984  - 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001) and own calculations. 
The latest statistics also show a significant decline in EU investments in the Gulf region. EU 
accumulated investments have halved from the €3 billion in 1999 to €1.5 billion in 2000. At 
the same time the GCC investments in the EU increased by more than 15% from about €4 
billion in 1999 to about €4.6 billion in 2000. The Commission and the GCC secretariat are 
working on a common approach to change this overall negative trend.  
Turning to the trade data, the GCC is currently the EU’s sixth largest export market. In 2001, 
EU exports to the GCC were over €34 billion whereas EU imports from the GCC amounted to 
just under €20 billion. The bulk of EU exports to the GCC are machinery and transport 
materials (47%). Chemical products and food make up 11% and 9% of total exports 
respectively, leaving the remaining exports to a wide variety of products, such as medicines 
and medical equipment. Owing to the large quantity of fuels (73% of total EU imports from 
the GCC countries) shipped from the Gulf, the GCC is the tenth largest source of imports for 
the EU. Less important imports from GCC are items of machinery and chemical products, 
each representing about 5% of total imports, transport materials and textiles being of lesser 
importance.  MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-GCC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 3 
 
Table 2. EU trade with the GCC in 2001 (€ million) 
 Imports  (I)
(to EU)
Share of 
EU Total 
Imports 
% of each in
Total (I/Ex)
Energy Energy as
% of (I)
Exports (X) 
(from EU) 
Share of 
all EU (X)
Bahrain 434 0.04%  5% 230 53.0% 895  0.1%
Kuwait 2,380 0.2%  17% 2,184 91.7% 2,747  0.3%
Oman 284 0.03%  2% 115 40.4% 1,441  0.1%
Qatar 669 0.1%  5% 115 17.2% 1,937  0.2%
Saudi 13,085 1.3%  17% 10,756 82.2% 13,230  1.3%
UAE 2813 0.3%  6% 813 28.9% 13,781  1.4%
Totals 19,665 1.97%  -  14,213 72.3% 34,031  3.4%
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001) and own calculations. 
At a total of €19,665 million in GCC exports (Table 2) to the EU represent 12% of total GCC 
exports – but just under 2% of total EU imports. This can be compared with the total figure of 
€101 billion for total EU imports from the EU-10 accession countries in 2001 – which 
amounts to almost 10% of total EU imports. In other words the EU-10 candidate countries 
were performing approximately five times as well as the GCC states in terms of export 
performance, despite, as can be seen in Table 3, having GDP per capita figures less than one-
third of the GCC average (€16,645 per capita) and a significantly lower ratio of total export 
intensity (35%) than the GCC states (46%). 
Table 3. Comparison of GCC total export performance with GDP per capita 
 GDP* € billion  GDP/Cap € Imports (Im) € million Exports (Ex) € million  EX/GDP ratio
EU-15 7,894  22520 -  -  11.4
GCC 368.2  16645  109,010 170,984  46%
AC-10 407  5432  195,019 141,953  34.9%
Notes: Accession candidates-10 are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001) and own calculations. 
The economic interpretation of this performance is that the present industrial structure of the 
GCC is not fully developed. Despite the bespoke nature of the Gulf economies, it is probably 
not the case that export intensity (or the preponderance of oil within it) is too high, but rather 
the small scale of domestic output – relative to export output – that is holding back overall 
economic performance. In other words, domestic activity is not thriving sufficiently on the 
back of the oil revenues generated. In some respects this reflects a classic ‘Dutch disease’ 
phenomenon, whereby oil resources displace investment from other potentially profitable 
sectors. A related explanation is that non-oil activity is being restrained because of sparse or 
inefficient provision of domestic services. 
As suggested in Table 4 below, the oil sector in the Gulf economies still contributes on 
average about one-third of GDP and accounts for three-quarters of annual government 
revenue and export receipts, making these countries vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. In 
addition, growth of non-oil GDP has been slow in some of these countries, while strains in the 
employment market for nationals have emerged, with the GCC labour markets remaining 
segmented between nationals and expatriates. The GCC governments are aware that an 
adequate response to these challenges will call for structural reforms, aimed at improving the 
allocation of resources and promoting private sector-led growth.  4 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
Table 4. Oil contribution to GCC GDP (2001) (in percentages) 
 Bahrain  Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi  UAE
Oil    17.8 43 42.7 58.4 28.4 28
Industry 12  6.5 8.3 5.8 14.9  13.9
Construction 4  2.3 2 3.4 6  7
Retail 12.8  6 11.4 8 13  9.2
Finance  19 6 -  3.4 2 7
Other services  10.6  30 -  -  5  9.5
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001) and own calculations. 
Although the Gulf states have managed their economies fairly skilfully over the last decades, 
the recent growth resurgence has come after a poor growth performance during the 1990s 
when oil prices were generally low. While the Gulf region will probably remain at the hub of 
both the world’s oil reserves and oil supply for some years to come, the physical limits of 
geology and increasingly ‘smart’ extraction techniques will enable rival sources of supply to 
begin to limit this advantage in the coming decades. 
In fact, GCC countries are currently at various stages of implementing structural and 
institutional reforms, including lifting impediments to foreign direct investment, streamlining 
business regulations, expanding private investment opportunities in key sectors and 
improving corporate governance. In summary, the GCC states almost certainly need to 
embrace change, to expand their economic activity to fit their endowment of human and 
intellectual resource capital rather than rely simply on their natural resource endowment.  
As far as GCC performance in trade in services is concerned, few reliable statistics are yet 
available, but in general the commitments made by WTO members of the GCC are low with 
the exception of Oman. Sectors such as distribution, finance and telecommunications remain 
relatively closed. 
Total EU imports from the GCC, at €19,665 million, represent just under 2% of total EU 
imports in 2000. This can be compared with EU imports from the Mediterranean countries of 
€78,768 million in 2000, which amounted to approximately 8% of the EU total. In other 
words the Mediterranean countries – an under-performing region – are performing 
approximately four times as well in services as the oil-rich states in the Gulf. 
So it seems likely that there are substantial economic gains to be had for the GCC states from 
the effective liberalisation of services, both in terms of greater economic efficiency and 
potentially higher growth rates. There is little doubt that an improved performance in services 
would contribute to an improvement in regional competitiveness (Hoekman and Messerlin, 
2002a). For example, Hoekman and Konan (1999) find using a simulation model that an EU-
Egypt free trade agreement limited to goods (but with substantial progress on removing 
regulatory barriers affecting goods sectors) could raise welfare in Egypt by around 4% whilst 
an agreement that reduced barriers to services in Egypt could raise economic welfare by over 
13%. 
3.  Structure and direction of GCC trade  
Among the GCC countries, Bahrain and the UAE are the most dependent on international 
trade, with a trade to GDP ratio of 65% and 64%, respectively in 2001. Data for other GCC 
members reveal ratios around 40%.  MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-GCC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 5 
 
In absolute terms, Saudi Arabia has the largest economy and is the largest trader, exporting 
around $79 billion in year 2000, followed by the UAE with $43 billion (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Direction of trade of the GCC economies, 2000 (US$ millions) 
 Bahrain  Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE  GCC
Imports    
Other GCC  1,185  271 1,737 260 1,114 2,916  7,483
Other Arab  165  794 305 281 1,651 420  3,616
Other Islamic  150  461 233 109 1,219 3,218  5,390
EU 1,416  2,137 1,044 1,419 8,936 11,582  26,534
US 488  936 345 195 5,738 3,372  11,074
Japan 182  975 816 284 2,786 3,186  8,229
ROW 867  2,044 895 703 8,856 14,890  28,255
Total Imports  4,453  7,619 5,375 3,251 30,299 39,584  90,582
Exports    
Other GCC  518  44 1,029 530 2,903 2,829  7,853
Other Arab  99  331 288 198 3,581 518  5,015
Other  Islamic  301 1,566 490 239 3,932 1,895 8,423
EU 316  2,226 175 364 12,082 2,107  17,270
US 296  2,248 135 422 12,353 827  16,281
Japan 246  4,436 2,567 4,995 11,872 9,979  34,095
ROW 3,924  8,723 6,635 4,778 32,031 25,140  81,231
Total  Exports  5,700  19,574 11,319 11,527 78,756 43,294 170,170 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001) and own calculations. 
As most GCC members are major oil, gas and petrochemical producers, most exports are 
directed towards non-GCC markets. With the exception of Bahrain and Oman, less than 9% 
of GCC-member exports go to GCC-partner countries (Table 6). The same is true for imports. 
Intra-GCC sourcing is large only for Bahrain and Oman (Table 6). In the case of Bahrain, 
much of these flows comprise crude oil, which is imported from Saudi Arabia, refined and 
exported to non-GCC buyers. Some countries such as the UAE are major trans-shipment hubs 
– a substantial share of imports of merchandise of some GCC countries from non-GCC 
sources flows through the UAE. This is the case in particular for Oman and Kuwait. This is 
registered as re-exports if the products concerned have not been transformed sufficiently for 
the origin of the goods to change to the UAE. 
Given the similarity of the natural resource endowments of many GCC countries and their 
small size, it is not surprising that they tend to trade relatively little with each other. Imports 
from the rest of the world account for 90% or more of total imports for most GCC states. 
Most imports comprise food, machinery and equipment and other manufactures, which 
together account for about 78% of the total. These goods are imported predominantly from 
non-GCC, non-Arab sources (Table 6). 
With the formation of a GCC customs union and plans for eventual monetary union, an 
argument can be made that the Gulf region’s (comparative) advantage needs to shift from one 
of pure natural resource management to what might be termed an ‘oil-plus’ economic 
structure. The challenge will be to do this by maintaining an edge as an advanced oil-6 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
technology economy, but also exploiting the natural and cultural advantages that GCC states 
enjoy in a period of shifting geopolitical advantage for the region. These advantages are 
essentially twofold: vis-à-vis the EU as a peripheral geographical actor and as a hub and 
exemplar to Islamic states worldwide.  
Table 6. Commodity composition of imports of the GCC economies, 2000 (in percentages) 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE  GCC
Food & Live Animals   12.4 15.2 12.0 10.2 15.9  7.0  11.4
Beverages & Tobacco  1.0 1.0 8.6 1.0 1.1  0.9  1.2
Crude Materials  2.2 2.0 2.9 2.6 1.8  5.0  2.9
Mineral Fuels  Lubricants  40.7 0.6 1.6 0.4 0.2  1.1  3.1
Animal/Veg Oils & Fat  1.2 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7  0.8  1.7
Chemicals 4.7 9.7 7.2 6.4 9.7  4.2  6.6
Manufacturing Goods  16.9 20.3 13.8 20.8 22.4  24.8  26.4
Machinery & Transport Equip  15.9 28.3 43.3 44.8 39.2  43.2  34.6
Misc. Manufactured Goods  5.0 12.3 6.1 13.1 5.2  10.8  10.0
Unclassified 0.0 0.9 3.7 0.1 3.9  2.2  2.6
Total Imports  100 100 100 100 100  100  100
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2001). 
Meeting this challenge must involve keeping ahead economically, and this must include the 
well-known transition – common to all advanced industrial economies – of mixing industrial 
products with increasingly sophisticated services provision. An example of this sort of 
interplay, in the financial services sector, is the dramatic growth of Bahrain and Dubai as 
financial centres. There are likely to be many more examples in finance, construction and 
engineering (to name but a few) where the comparative advantage may be less obvious until 
increased exposure to service-sector practice occurs.  
The key implication of such changes will be an inexorable shift in macroeconomic stance 
away from dollar-denominated assets, as well as gradual but more subtle shifts within 
portfolio and direct investment profiles. The common denominator in all these developments 
will be the need to enhance and develop indigenous skills and resources in the management of 
service activities.  
Thus a subtle realignment of thinking (FTA negotiations suggest this is already occurring) 
should guide the approach to both multilateral and regional negotiations on trade in goods and 
services. Rather than show an undue concern to protect the current pattern of oil exports and 
imports of goods and services – where dominance in oil exports is probably secure in the 
medium term – a proactive approach to enhancing this conventional trade pattern with a 
subtle overlay of service expertise should act as a guide to policy formulation. 
This is because international trade in services – although often a more potent source of growth 
and prosperity than goods trade – is at its core very different to the conventional laisser-faire 
economics of trade and direct investment as harbingers of ‘globalisation’.  
4.  Possible impacts of a CU and an FTA 
To assess the trade and welfare impacts of both the recently adopted GCC customs union and 
the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement, a computable trade simulation model has been MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-GCC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 7 
 
constructed. The model is used in addition to consider the impacts of alternative scenarios for 
comparative purposes. The two additional scenarios are: the GCC countries set their common 
external tariff at a level lower than the 5% level adopted officially;
1 and the EU and GCC 
countries extend their free trade agreement to the world at large on a most favoured nation 
(MFN) basis, in effect, adopting a policy of ‘open regionalism’ similar to that espoused by 
economists and some international organisations.
2  
4.1  Trade liberalisation winners and losers  
Poor economic performance is widely believed to be a contributing factor to the political 
insecurity of the Middle East and the wider Middle East and North African region. Despite 
substantial petroleum resources, the region has failed to enjoy the same growth levels and 
increased economic welfare that many ‘emerging market’ countries in other parts of the world 
have enjoyed during the past two decades.
3 Indeed, this failure by the GCC and other poorly- 
performing Mediterranean countries has become the focus of international concern aimed at 
improving the region’s economic performance as a precursor to establishing peace and 
security in the region. 
The reasons for the poor economic performance in these countries are undoubtedly likely to 
be numerous and complex, but an important element has undoubtedly been the inward-
orientation of the region, with comparatively high rates of trade protection shielding 
inefficient domestic economic performance, low investment rates (both domestic and 
foreign), a larger than appropriate government sector along with excessive government 
planning and regulatory restrictions. Reversing this situation will involve not only lowering 
protection and encouraging foreign direct investment but also fostering reforms to domestic 
economic policies and restoring greater private sector initiative to the economy – not to 
mention those of a social and political character. 
Given their status as oil-exporters, the GCC countries are more open to trade than many other 
countries in the region. Nonetheless, general economic performance in terms of per capita 
growth has been disappointing in the GCC countries, led in particular by the negative per 
capita growth of Saudi Arabia during the 1990s (Table A1).
4 Although foreign investment is 
somewhat higher in the GCC countries than in the rest of the region, it is concentrated mainly 
in the oil sector, with little consequent benefit to the diversification and expansion of industry 
or of employment.  
Recognising the potential of further trade liberalisation to help improve their economies, the 
GCC countries converted their former free trade area into a customs union in January 2003 
and agreed to accelerate negotiations of a free trade agreement with the EU – the motive for 
this study.
5  Embracing change of this magnitude, while simply the first step in a longer 
                                                           
1 The GCC common external tariff includes exclusions for ‘essential’ goods in a total of 53 HS 6-digit level 
categories (Roy and Zarrouk, 2002). These exclusions are not accounted for in the present analysis. Also 
notably, the trade simulation model does not take into account the erstwhile GCC free trade area or other pre-
existing free trade agreements between individual countries in the model. 
2 For discussion, mainly in the context of support for the concept by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) group, see Bergsten (1997), see also ADB (2000) and Schiff & Winters (2003). 
3 See Abed (2003), Dasgupta et al. (2002) and Hoekman & Messerlin (2002). 
4 Overviews of GCC trade in services and GCC directions and structure of merchandise trade are presented 
without discussion in accompanying Tables A2-A4. 
5 The GCC was established in 1981, though it is not known when the bloc's free trade area came fully into force; 
see WTO (1995), Roy & Zarrouk (2002) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003). 8 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
process of ‘deeper’ liberalisation and integration, should have a substantial one-off (or 
‘static’) impact on trade and economic welfare, which must be of considerable interest to all 
stakeholders interested in improving economic performance in the Gulf states and wider 
Middle East.  
Hence, prior to the modelling it is helpful to get a rough idea of the likely economic impact of 
a potential EU-GCC free trade agreement and before that of the likely benefits to be had from 
the current GCC customs union, once these have been worked through. As the Gulf region is 
predominantly a natural resource exporter to the EU and an importer (largely) of technical 
goods and services, chemicals and some metals and minerals, given the relative sizes of the 
economies and current tariff structures, we can suggest a set of a priori hypotheses as to the 
likely economic effects.  
1)  Intra-GCC trade might not be expected to increase greatly under the CU as a) such trade 
should already have been boosted by the pre-existing GCC free trade area and b) the 
economies are considered by many to be similar in their economic structures, which 
suggests there may be little current scope for the evolution of domestic comparative 
advantage. 
2)  There may be little scope for expanding GCC trade into the EU under an FTA, as the 
average tariff paid on EU imports from the GCC has tended to be low, and in the case of 
oil and gas products non-existent. 
3)  Nevertheless, there should be greater scope for expanding EU trade into the GCC under 
the FTA.
6 EU exports to the GCC generally face very high tariffs, in contrast to the very 
low average tariffs paid in the EU. These range from 3% and 4% in the case of Kuwait 
and Qatar to 14% and 16% in the case of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain respectively. The 
average import tariff import tariff faced by EU exporters to the GCC bloc has been just 
under 10% (see Tables A1 and A6).  
Finally, as well as the aggregate impacts for the EU/GCC, the qualitative analysis should also 
be concerned with assessing any likely single-country, intra-GCC impacts. In particular, we 
will wish to examine how the two formerly low-tariff economies – Kuwait and Qatar – would 
fare in regard to potential trade diversion to the other GCC states as a result of having to raise 
their low average tariff rates upwards (albeit only slightly) to the new 5% GCC common 
external tariff.  
In the following section we set out a method to test these hypotheses using a simple, 
regionally based, world trade model, disaggregated by the major sections of the harmonised 
system (HS) of traded goods and incorporating current information about the tariff structures 
of the European Union, GCC countries, other specified countries and the rest of the world. 
5.  Methodology 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. First, we introduce the five trade-
outcome scenarios to be modelled (section 5.1); then we describe the modelling methodology 
used (section 5.2); how it has been tailored to an assessment of the new GCC customs union 
and the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement (section 5.3); then the method by which the 
model computes trade creation, trade diversion and economic welfare (5.4); before finally 
presenting the simulation modelling results (section 6.).  
                                                           
6 Although this potential impact (from the FTA) could be diluted if Saudi Arabian tariffs are unilaterally lowered 
as a part of its offer to join the WTO, given its dominance of the GCC. MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-GCC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 9 
 
Results are summarised in aggregate terms for all the GCC countries and for the EU as a 
whole, and then where possible for the six individual GCC states, and lastly in a 
disaggregated analysis across the 21 industrial sectors covered. Finally, section 7 summarises 
the principal findings of the study and relates these to the prospects for a wider (and 
potentially deeper) trade liberalisation agenda and the implications for the GCC region of 
progress in services trade and for attracting foreign direct investment. 
5.1  Five trade liberalisation scenarios 
In all, five trade liberalisation scenarios are considered (Table A8). For the purposes of the 
present study it is important to calibrate any gains from intra-GCC trade made available by 
the completion of the GCC customs union first, before continuing to calculate any additional 
gains to be had from any prospective EU-GCC agreement. 
Hence, scenarios 1 and 3 correspond to the recently adopted GCC customs union and the 
proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement, assuming a 5% GCC CET in both scenarios. In 
recognition of the fact that a 5% CET will impose economic costs on those GCC countries 
that previously maintained an average tariff level of less than 5% (mainly Kuwait and Qatar), 
scenarios 2 and 4 consider the impacts of a yet lower GCC CET, namely, one set at the 
minimum level of GCC tariffs in each goods category (corresponding to an average CET of 
3.3%). Lastly, the open regionalism scenario (scenario 5), depicts an ideal situation wherein 
both the EU and GCC jointly pursue free trade on a MFN basis.
7 
In addition, we wish to identify the internationally competitive sectors for each preferential 
trade-liberalisation scenario (scenarios 1-4). Of course it is to be expected, under the two 
basic GCC customs union scenarios, that mineral products will be the sole competitive sector 
and, as imports of mineral products are not highly protected in the GCC countries, any 
benefits to GCC consumers are likely to be limited here. But GCC producers may be more 
likely to experience significant gains under the new customs union through increased intra-
GCC exports, though their margins of preference will be limited to 5% by the CET.  
We are particularly interested to see whether the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement 
expands the number of internationally competitive sectors to include perhaps several 
manufactured goods categories in which the EU producers are internationally competitive and 
in which trade creation might be expected to occur in the GCC. At the same time new 
opportunities could be opened up for expanding exports by GCC producers to the EU as well 
as neighbouring Gulf countries. 
A priori, the analysis of expected gains to EU consumers will be more problematic given the 
relatively low levels of tariff protection in the European Union.
8   Some EU exporters, 
however, might expect significant gains from their margins of preference in GCC countries in 
the non-competitive sectors identified in Table A8. 
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each of the five scenarios it is implicitly assumed that the EU and GCC countries simultaneously eliminate non-
tariff barriers to imports. 
8 Notably, under the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement, EU consumers do not benefit from trade creation 
in the internationally competitive sectors identified in Table A8 because it is the aggregate export capacity of the 
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5.2  Trade simulation model  
The simulation model used in this study is a partial equilibrium model of world trade 
developed to quantify the economic impacts of the new GCC customs union and proposed 
EU-GCC free trade agreement (Viner, 1950).
9 In addition to trade of the six individual GCC 
and other Mediterranean countries, the model includes the trade of the European Union (as a 
bloc), Japan, the US and other industrial countries and developing countries to yield a 
complete model of world trade in homogeneous goods, disaggregated by the 21 major 
sections of the harmonised system (Table A2). The ‘small country’ assumption is maintained 
throughout the model. Under this assumption, each country is assumed to be insufficiently 
large to affect its international terms of trade through variations in the volume of either its 
exports or imports. 
The trade simulation model is based on familiar (log-linear) import demand and export supply 
functions for traded goods.
10 As seen in Table A5, it is disaggregated by categories of primary 
products and manufactures covering all merchandise trade. Market-clearing conditions for 
each category of traded goods determine international prices and an equilibrium balance of 
payments condition determines the (real) exchange rate for each country. In addition to 
determining changes in trade flows and import tariff revenues, the model computes changes in 
economic welfare based on familiar notions of consumer surplus and producer surplus 
(Harberger, 1954, 1971).  
The present model does not explicitly account for non-tariff barriers. Nevertheless, the 
influence of non-tariff barriers is captured in the model by the fitted values of the import 
demand intercept terms. In model simulations the implicit assumption is that binding non-
tariff barriers are simultaneously eliminated as part of the GCC customs union and EU-GCC 
free trade agreement scenarios. 
Representing a customs union or a free trade agreement in the trade simulation model requires 
some intricacy when dealing with the special considerations of price determination, trade 
creation, trade diversion and most importantly the changes in economic welfare. Nevertheless, 
the primary elements in the scenario modelling methodology are set out in the following 
section. 
5.3  Representing a customs union or FTA 
In the basic model, the international  price of good k expressed in US dollars, P
*
k, is 
determined largely independently of the behaviour of consumers and producers in any single 
country or any small group of countries. Under a customs union or free trade agreement, 
however, trade of member countries with non-member countries might be largely diverted and 
an independent intra-bloc export price for good k, P
xr
k (denominated in US dollars), might be 
established so long as the intra-bloc export price falls within acceptable bounds to producers 
and consumers who will continue to have recourse to markets for traded goods outside the 
customs union or FTA. 
On the one hand, if member countries as a bloc are net exporters of the good to the world, as 
for example would certainly likely be the case for petroleum and other mineral products in 
any GCC-based trading bloc, the intra-bloc price of exports is set equal to the international 
                                                           
9 On Vinerian and more general approaches to customs union theory, see also Meade (1955), Lipsey (1970), 
Lloyd (1982), Robson (1987), Pomfret (1988) and DeRosa (1998). 
10 The trade simulation model is described in detail in a background paper (DeRosa, 2003). MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-GCC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 11 
 
price of the traded good. In this instance, the customs union or free trade agreement succeeds 
in lowering the price of imports to consumers in the preferential trading area if member 
countries impose a tariff on imports of the good.  
On the other hand, if member countries as a bloc are net importers of the good from the 
world, then the intra-bloc price of exports P
xr
k is set equal to the international price multiplied 
by one plus a premium τ
r
k equal to highest external MFN tariff level of the bloc member 
whose import demand just ‘clears’ the bloc’s combined exports of the product. Notably, in the 
case of a customs union the premium will be equal to the common external tariff for the 
product. Also, in the case of either a customs union or free trade agreement, the preferential 
trading arrangement will succeed in lowering import prices faced by consumers only in those 
member countries for which the premium is lower than their initial most-favoured nation 
tariff. 
In the trade simulation model, each country’s balance of payments is valued at border prices, 
in US dollars. In summary, the foregoing relationships under a GCC customs union or EU-
GCC free trade agreement posit:  
1)  lower consumer prices and unchanged border prices for internationally competitive goods 
produced by bloc exporters; and,  
2)  unchanged consumer prices but higher border prices for non-internationally competitive 
goods produced by bloc exporters. The higher border prices for non-internationally 
competitive goods include (per unit) forgone tariff revenues of importing member 
countries captured by non-competitive exporters in partner member countries.  
In the latter case, the trade simulation model assumes that, while consumers in member 
countries continue to import from non-member countries, producers in member countries 
divert the entire volume of their exports of non-competitive goods to partner member 
countries in response to the higher intra-bloc prices for their exports occasioned by the 
customs union, thereby maximising their export revenues and especially their gains from 
trade. 
5.4  Trade creation, trade diversion and economic welfare 
The trade simulation model is required to quantify the relative impact of trade creation, trade 
diversion and changes in the economic welfare in member countries of the customs union. 
The additional equations required to achieve this are solved in a recursive manner, after the 
basic model is solved for equilibrium levels of trade, prices and exchange rates. 
The most important impact of a customs union (or FTA) will be on economic welfare, which 
is divided into three components: changes in consumer surplus, changes in producer surplus 
and forgone import tariff revenues. Consumer surplus refers to the net benefit that consumers 
derive from purchases of a good at market prices at less than their marginal benefit from the 
good. Producer surplus refers to earnings producers enjoy at market prices above their 
marginal variable costs. Finally, forgone tariff revenues are reduced tariff revenues captured 
by member country exporters under the customs union or FTA arising from their margins of 
preference under the preferential trading arrangement. 
On a combined basis, changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus (less forgone tariff 
revenues) equal the change in national economic welfare. The change in consumer surplus 
corresponds to the change in national welfare, occasioned mainly by trade creation. The 
change in producer surplus corresponds to the change in national welfare brought about 12 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
mainly by trade diversion. Forgone tariff revenues correspond to the change in national 
welfare due to forgoing tariff revenue on duty-free imports that would otherwise have been 
captured by government and redistributed to domestic consumers in one form or another.
11 
5.5  Database and parameter values 
The trade simulation model identifies 19 countries (including the six GCC countries), the EU, 
Japan, the US, a group of other major industrial countries and a group of other developing 
countries along with 21 broad categories of traded goods that are identified individually in 
(Table A5). The model’s underlying database of international trade statistics, presented in the 
Appendix, is compiled on an average basis for 1999-2001 from the COMTRADE database of 
the UN Statistics Division (UNSD, 2003). Corresponding protection statistics detailing ad 
valorem tariffs applied to imports on an MFN basis, presented in Table A6, are compiled 
from the UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (UNCTAD, 2003), for the most 
recent year available. The remaining parameters in the trade simulation model consist of own-
price elasticities of import demand and export supply (Table A7). The values of these 
parameters, assumed to be identical for all countries in the model, are a priori values based on 
estimates of price elasticities in international trade reported in surveys of econometric studies 
such as Stern et al. (1976). 
6.  Results 
In reading the results, it is not appropriate to match up changes in real exports and net trade 
creation, since world trade adjustment effects in the simulation model are the key to the 
results obtained. An intuitive explanation of the way the model works can be construed briefly 
as follows. The results tabulations summarise the four analytical blocks in the model, which 
are: 
1.  Exchange rate (ER) changes and export changes – the exchange rate change is inversely 
related to the change in the domestic price of exports, so this gives a strong indication of 
changes in price incentives to export producers. 
2.  Net TC = TC - TD, and TC is equal to change in real imports. These are popular Vinerian 
measures of the welfare impacts of customs unions and FTAs. 
3.  More formal welfare measurement is given by the summation of changes in consumer 
surplus (net of change in tariff revenue), producer surplus and forgone tariff revenues. 
4.  Changes in actual tariff revenues, which are important to LDC governments and policy-
makers, are of limited importance to national economic welfare in pure theory terms. 
When thinking about what’s happening in the model, it is often helpful to think about what 
the initial impacts are on the balance of payments, then which way the ER must adjust. As an 
example, the MFN scenario is easiest to understand. Countries reducing protection will have 
an initial balance of payments deficit (because of increased import demand), which must be 
eliminated by ER depreciation and expanded exports. The CU and FTA scenarios are variants 
of the MFN scenario in which the extent of trade liberalisation is somewhat less (where 
moderate to large amounts of trade diversions occur), calling forth smaller ER adjustments, 
etc. 
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It is particularly important to grasp the implications of the internationally competitive sectors 
identified in Table A8. Basically, ‘non-internationally competitive’ sectors are where most of 
the trade diversion is occurring. There is nothing particularly counter-intuitive in the 
internationally competitive sectors identified in Table A8, except that as greater numbers of 
countries or large countries such as the EU participate in the concerted trade liberalisation, 
more and more previously uncompetitive sectors become subject to the discipline of 
international competition, to the benefit of consumers in previously sheltered markets.  
Thus, the CU scenarios result in a lot of trade diversion in the GCC countries, but the FTA 
scenarios counteract this, because the EU’s export capacity is so large, somewhat as if the 
GCC were liberalising trade with the world.  
Nevertheless, a caveat should be noted: the results for exports of a particular industrial sector 
(e.g. agriculture) by the EU to (agricultural) imports by the GCC will not necessarily match 
because the exports and imports are with the world. Other important magnitudes will, 
however, match up more precisely. These include significantly, world demand and supply for 
each commodity and the (dollar) valuation of the balance of payments (BOP = 0). These 
conditions drive determination of world prices and exchange rates for each country. 
Finally, with regard to industry-specific effects among domestic producers, the model merely 
associates ‘winners’ with export-expanding sectors and ‘losers’ with import-expanding 
sectors. That is, where exports expand appreciably domestic producers might be assumed to 
be expanding output and where imports expand appreciably domestic producers might be 
assumed to be facing stiffer competition (and reducing their output).  
6.1 Detailed  results 
Table A8 indicates the internationally competitive sectors identified by the trade simulation 
model for each preferential trade-liberalisation scenario (scenarios 1-4). As expected, under 
the basic GCC customs union scenarios, mineral products is the sole competitive sector. 
Given that imports of mineral products are not highly protected in the GCC countries, the 
benefit to GCC consumers is likely to be limited. Instead, GCC exporters are likely to gain 
significantly from the margins of preference under the new customs union, though the 
margins will be limited to 5% by the CET. The proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement 
expands the number of internationally competitive sectors to include several, mainly 
manufactured goods categories in which substantial trade creation might be expected to occur 
in especially the GCC countries under the proposed FTA. At the same time it would be 
expected to open new opportunities for expanding exports by GCC producers to the EU as 
well as neighbouring Gulf countries. 
As expected, potential gains to EU consumers are more difficult to identify given the 
relatively low level of tariff protection in the European Union.
12  EU exporters, however, 
might be expected to experience significant potential gains from their margins of preference 
in GCC countries in non-competitive sectors. 
The trade simulation model results for the GCC and the EU are summarised in Table A9 and 
Table A10 respectively, disaggregated by three broad trade categories: agriculture, minerals 
and manufacturing. Simulation results are presented in a like manner for the six individual 
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GCC countries in Tables A11-A16. The detailed simulation results, namely, those by the 21 
sections of the Harmonised System, are reported in the Appendix for the EU and the six 
individual GCC states respectively.  
The simulation results for the GCC customs union are considered first, then the simulation 
results for the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement. This ordering of the simulation results 
enables determination of the impact on the GCC countries of adopting the FTA ‘on top of’ 
their recently adopted customs union. Finally, the simulation results for the MFN scenario, 
considered last, provide an indication of the degree to which the customs union and FTA 
trading arrangements lead to trade and welfare impacts approximating those under the most 
liberal free trade arrangements possible between the GCC countries and the EU, namely, open 
regionalism. 
6.2  GCC customs union 
The GCC customs union involves the GCC countries simultaneously adopting a zero tariff on 
trade with one another and a common external tariff on trade with the rest of the world. Given 
the initial tariff rates of members in Table A6, the 5% CET involves an appreciable reduction 
in the average level of tariffs in the GCC countries, except Kuwait and Qatar, which 
previously applied an average MFN rate of 3% to 4%. Thus, although the CET might be 
expected to be trade-creating in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
it might be substantially less so in Kuwait and Qatar, the two most outward-oriented GCC 
countries. In recognition of this, a second customs union scenario is considered in which the 
CET is set no higher than the lowest tariff level of the GCC countries in each commodity 
category (resulting in an average CET of 3.3%). This ‘textbook’ version of the GCC customs 
union leaves no GCC member compelled to adopt a higher external tariff and hence it should 
be expected to result in somewhat greater economic benefits for Kuwait and Qatar as well as 
the bloc as a whole.
13 
Under both representations of the GCC customs union, liberalisation of external tariffs results 
in depreciation of GCC exchange rates by 3% to 4% on average, as demand for imports, 
especially imports of manufactures, is stimulated in GCC countries by the component of 
general trade liberalisation under the new customs union. Simultaneously, to maintain balance 
of payment equilibrium, domestic export prices rise, giving exporters an incentive to increase 
their exports of not only mineral products (petroleum) but also manufactured products such as 
chemicals, metal products, and textiles and clothing – the most labour-intensive of these 
manufactured products being typically clothing (see presentation of simulation results by HS 
section in the Appendix). 
The supposition that the minimum CET leads to greater benefits than the 5% CET is 
confirmed in the simulation results, but the margin of economic benefit measured in terms of 
either net trade creation or overall economic welfare is not particularly large. For the GCC 
countries as a bloc, net trade creation improves by less than $300 million, from $1,279 million 
to $1,591 million, and overall economic welfare relative to GDP improves by only about 0.3 
percentage points, from 1.5% to 1.8%. These results for the GCC bloc, however, mask 
important results for the two low tariff GCC countries, Kuwait and Qatar. In both of these 
countries, welfare losses amounting to about 0.5% of GDP under the GCC customs union 
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with a 5% CET are reduced to nearly zero under the alternative GCC customs union with a 
minimum CET. In the high tariff GCC countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE) welfare 
gains are higher by margins of 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points under the alternative GCC 
customs union incorporating the minimum CET. 
Under the GCC customs union, GCC tariff revenues decline by between $4,493 million and 
$5,478 million, or about 2% of GDP. Yet, only $500 to $700 million of the decline in tariff 
revenues is forgone tariff revenues and hence a true economic cost. The remaining tariff 
revenue losses are simply a transfer between the government and domestic consumers, with 
no net impact on national economic welfare. 
Given that the European Union is not party to the GCC custom union, EU economic welfare 
is not affected by adoption of the GCC customs union (Table A10) and the modest impact on 
EU trade found by the trade simulation model occurs only indirectly through the adjustment 
of world prices. 
6.3  An EU-GCC free trade agreement 
The proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement would provide wider opportunities than the GCC 
customs union for preferential market access by the GCC exporters, namely in the lucrative 
EU market. Also, as noted previously, GCC consumers should be expected to benefit from 
duty-free access to EU exports in the internationally competitive sectors identified in Table 
A8, including (among others) chemicals, machinery and transport equipment. 
In Table A9, the proposed FTA results in somewhat greater depreciation of the exchange rate 
in GCC countries (about 6.5% on average) than under the GCC customs union and in Table 
A10 in a modest appreciation of the EU exchange rate on average (about 0.3%).  
For the GCC countries, the exchange rate impact follows from appreciable expansion of duty-
free imports induced by the FTA, by about $1,500 million (and, again, from the concomitant 
necessity that exports expand sufficiently to maintain balance of payments equilibrium). 
Indeed, trade diversion under the FTA is reduced by comparison to trade diversion under the 
customs union precisely because of the capacity of the EU export supply to satisfy GCC 
import demand fully at a duty-free price in the internationally competitive sectors identified in 
Table A8.  
For the EU, the exchange rate impacts follow mainly from the FTA-induced expansion of 
exports in non-competitive sectors where EU exporters would enjoy margins of preference in 
the GCC countries and from the inability of the GCC countries to satisfy EU import demand 
fully at a duty-free price in any sector in the model. For the EU, trade diversion effects and 
forgone tariff revenues dominate the simulation results such that trade creation is negative on 
a net basis and the computed change in economic welfare is also negative. The underlying 
trade impacts of the EU-GCC free trade agreement, however, are small relative to the GDP of 
the European Union so that the changes in both EU economic welfare and tariff revenues are 
insignificant relative to EU output in the aggregate. 
This is not the case for the GCC countries. Under the EU-GCC free trade agreement, both net 
trade creation and economic welfare are substantially greater than under the GCC customs 
union, and the improvement in GCC economic welfare relative to GDP is a full percentage 
point or more greater on average than under the customs union, including in the two low-tariff 
countries, Kuwait and Qatar. GCC consumers gain most from increased imports of 
manufactures at duty-free prices in the internationally competitive sectors, while GCC 16 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
producers gain most from increased exports of minerals (petroleum) induced by the further 
exchange rate depreciation. Finally, it is apparent in Table A9 that forgone tariff revenues and 
changes in actual tariff revenues under the EU-GCC free trade agreement remain very similar 
in magnitude to those under the GCC customs union, especially when the minimum CET is 
assumed. 
6.4 Open  regionalism 
The results of the MFN trade liberalisation scenario are clearly superior to those for either the 
GCC customs union or EU-GCC free trade agreement. They indicate that economic welfare 
relative to GDP would be improved by 3.2% on average in the GCC countries and by 0.8% on 
average in the European Union. It is also apparent from the results of the MFN trade 
liberalisation scenario that the loss in tariff revenues is greater than in the other scenarios. 
Nevertheless, unlike in the preferential trade liberalisation scenarios, changes in tariff 
revenues under MFN trade liberalisation are entirely transfers between the government and 
domestic consumers because no trade diversion or forgone tariff revenues occur. 
Remarkably, the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement yields an aggregate welfare gain for 
the GCC countries (2.7% to 2.9%) that is similar in magnitude to the aggregate welfare gain 
for the GCC countries under open regionalism (3.2%). Thus, on economic welfare grounds, 
the proposed FTA should be preferred by GCC countries to their current customs union, 
which yields substantially smaller welfare gains (1.5% to 1.8%). Further, the simulation 
results indicate that if the current 5% CET of the GCC customs union were lowered 
significantly as part of the FTA negotiations, namely, to the minimum CET average (3.3%) or 
a still lower level, the trade and welfare gains to the GCC countries would be decidedly close 
to those under non-discriminatory trade liberalisation. Also, simultaneously adopting a lower 
CET with the proposed FTA would further increase the attractiveness of the GCC countries to 
outward-oriented foreign direct investment by multinational corporations globally (not solely 
EU-based multinational corporations), given that foreign direct investment decisions in the 
global economy today are importantly influenced by, among other factors, the openness of the 
host country’s trade regime.  
7.  Discussion & conclusions 
Against the backdrop of the recent disappointing economic performance of several GCC 
countries and increasing concerns for the productive employment of both skilled and 
unskilled labour in these countries, this paper has sought to quantify the economic impacts of 
the new GCC customs union and proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement on the six GCC 
countries. Using a computable partial equilibrium model of world trade focused on the region, 
the analysis yields insights relevant to the possible trade and welfare impacts of the new and 
proposed preferential trading arrangements between the GCC countries and the European 
Union, albeit limited by the inevitable shortcomings of the quantitative analysis but also by 
the still incomplete details surrounding the new GCC customs union and the ongoing 
negotiations of the proposed FTA between the EU and GCC countries. 
To add clarity, we group the discussion of conclusions in the following way. First we take a 
look at the ‘big picture’. A comparison of the outcome of the CU for the GCC when 
compared with the outcome of an FTA (for EU and GCC) and finally contrast this with the 
‘idealised’ position called ‘open regionalism’. Second, we examine any ‘intra-bloc effects’ 
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effects that may result from an FTA. Finally, we look at any industry-specific effects that 
might emerge from the trade reforms in terms of gains and loses for particular industry sectors 
(where possible).  
Looked at in this way, the core ‘global’ message coming from this analysis is that the CU has 
a small positive benefit for the GCC, but the FTA has a greater one – both for the GCC and 
the EU whereas open regionalism does best (but only slightly better than FTA). 
At the level of regional effects, intra-GCC trade increases most in the CU. But GCC exports 
increase more under the FTA and the EU doesn’t lose out on increasing exports into the 
GCC. This last effect may be as a result of some relaxing of the ‘Dutch Disease’ distortions, 
which result in non-oil GCC exports increasing into the EU and the world, as well as the EU’s 
export share being maintained in the GCC. 
Finally, at the level of industry effects, we would expect low- to medium-tech (i.e. previously 
Dutch-disease constrained), non-oil export sectors such as clothing or textiles to expand 
throughout  the GCC, as these benefit from new access into the EU under an FTA. 
Nevertheless, export gains for the EU into the GCC also appear to be likely, predominantly in 
high-tech, non-oil sectors.  
In general, the quantitative results indicate that both the new GCC customs union and the 
proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement would appreciably expand trade and improve the 
economic welfare in the GCC countries, with little significant economic impact on the EU. 
Given the dominance of petroleum in the exports of the GCC countries, adjustment of trade in 
this sector dominates much of the quantitative results. Both the new customs union and the 
proposed preferential trading arrangement stimulate trade in some other important sectors, 
however, including GCC exports in labour-intensive sectors such as clothing and in more 
skilled labour-intensive sectors such as chemicals and metal products. 
As might be expected, the proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement results in larger trade and 
welfare gains for the Gulf countries. Indeed, trade diversion under the FTA is reduced by 
comparison to trade diversion under the customs union because of the capacity of EU 
exporters to fully satisfy the (currently constrained) GCC demand for imports at duty-free 
prices in a number of internationally competitive sectors. GCC consumers would gain 
opportunities to enjoy imports of chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, among other 
major categories of trade goods, at internationally competitive prices, with little trade 
diversion. On the production side, the source of the welfare benefits can also be traced to 
greater gains for GCC exporters, mainly in response to greater depreciation of the exchange 
rate under the proposed FTA, rather than preferential access to the lucrative EU market for 
imports. 
The reason for large intra-GCC effects under the CU is that considerable trade diversion 
occurs – trade diversion that is undone in part when the EU enters the picture under the FTA 
(this effect shows through reasonably clearly in the results). An important point to keep in 
mind is that the high-protection GCC countries receive a particularly important, positive boost 
from liberalising their MFN tariffs under the new 5% CET. 
Most of the above points can be made with reference to Tables A9 & A10. Reading across the 
five scenarios from left to right in Table A9 (GCC) or Table A10 (EU) we observe that all the 
trade creation, consumer surplus and welfare measures increase progressively as we go from 
left to right. The simulation results should be read as applying per annum, in perpetuity.  18 | DEROSA & KERNOHAN 
 
So, although the model results are not ‘dynamic’ in the proper sense of the term and in many 
cases appear small (for instance relative to GDP), they are likely to be long-lived and their 
present value is not unimportant. The simulation results, if they became reality, would loom 
very large indeed, especially to individual firms and consumers,  
The two ‘sensitive’ GCC countries, Kuwait and Qatar, are the two GCC countries with initial 
tariff rates below the 5% CET. We can see that they are not significantly disadvantaged under 
the CU and their position is again improved under the FTA. 
Although the simulated welfare gains under the proposed FTA closely approximate welfare 
gains under a policy of open regionalism (i.e. EU-GCC trade liberalisation on an MFN basis), 
the GCC countries should consider lowering their current CET from 5% to a figure closer to 
3% as part of the current FTA negotiations. By doing so, the GCC countries would be better 
placed to attract the outward-oriented foreign direct investment. | 19 
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